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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Priority No. 2

v.

:

HEATHER ALENE BERLIN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970273-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), an enhanced first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) and 58-37-8(5)(a)(viii) (1996 & Supp. 1997). This Court has
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court properly determine that defendant failed to
establish a prima facie case of entrapment?
2. Did the trial court enter supportive factual findings?

Defendant fails to ground her claims in the record or with case authority.
They should be rejected on that ground. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1992);

State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1995):
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into
committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a law
enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting in
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an
offense in order to obtain evidence of the commission for
prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to
commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity
to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.

(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear
evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact
and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit the
offense...
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the
court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue
may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute, an enhanced first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-378(l)(a)(iv) and 58-37-8(5)(a)(viii) (1996 & Supp. 1997) (R. 3).
Defendant filed a Notice of Entrapment Defense (R. 41-42), and a
supporting memorandum (R. 51-64) (copies are contained in addendum A). An
2

evidentiary hearing was held on 7-8 November 1996 (R. 47,65). The trial court ruled
that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of entrapment, and on that ground,
declined to dismiss the criminal charge (R. 563) (a complete copy of the trial court's oral
ruling is contained in addendum B). Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty
plea, preserving her right to challenge the trial court's ruling (R. 69-76).
The trial court imposed the statutory term, fines and fees (R. 90). The trial
court then stayed the imposition of sentence and placed defendant on a 36-month term of
probation (Id).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case arises out of a drug culturefriendshipwhich developed over the
course of a few months between defendant, a drug dealer, and one of her customers, Terri
Williams1 (R. 312-13, 334, 357,466). After a stint in jail, Williams became disillusioned
with the lifestyle and approached the St. George Police Department to work as a
confidential informant in November 1995 (164-71,182,193,232-35, 307-08,311).
Williams was working as a confidential informant a few months later, on 20 January
1996, when she participated in a controlled drug buy in the parking lot of Lin's
Thriftway, in St. George, Utah. Defendant sold her two grams of methamphetamine for
$200 (R. 326-328,457).

1

By the time of the entrapment hearing, Williams had married and went by
the last name of Hoskey (R. 178).

3

When drug charges were filed against her, defendant claimed that she had
been entrapped by Williams, who, as a result of theirfriendshipwas aware of defendant's
emotional and financial vulnerabilities (R. 41-42), addendum A. An evidentiary hearing
on defendant's entrapment claim was held on 7-8 November 1996 (R. 47,65). The trial
credited defendant's assertions regarding the nature of her relationship with Williams (R.
552).2 In addition to considering Williams' importance to defendant as afriend,the trial
court took into account defendant's susceptibilities as an average drug dealer/user (R.
553-54). Ultimately, however, the trial court deemed Williams'friendshipwith
defendant an insufficient basis upon which to support defendant's claims of entrapment
(R. 552-563).
Specifically, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant's
claim (R. 552), the trial court found that Williams and defendant "shared conversations on
intimate and personal subjects regarding difficulties in each of their lives on many
occasions" (R. 559). For example, Williams was aware that defendant was separated
from her husband, and raising their two children without any financial assistance from her
husband (R. 556); that defendant received $700 in public assistance per month (R. 557);
that defendant did not have a car (R. 558); that Williams and otherfriendsprovided rides
for defendant and her children (id); that defendant was in the process of purchasing a car

2

The trial court's oral findings were not formalized into a written ruling. A
complete copy of the trial court's oral ruling is contained in addendum B.
4

from another of herfriendsin the drug culture (id); that defendant had recently received
an eviction notice (R. 560); and that Williams had offered to help defendant find new
housing (R. 568).
Williams was also aware that police had executed a search warrant for
defendant's residence on 5 January 1996, seizing approximately six grams of
methamphetamine, and approximately $600 cash; that defendant admitted some of the
cash seized "constituted drug money" (R. 557); that defendant received financial
assistance from her family to pay for legal counsel and to make bail (R. 558); Williams
was aware defendant had appeared in district court on 17 January 1996, on yet another
drug charge (Id.).
Based on his observations of both defendant and Williams at the entrapment
hearing, the trial court further found that defendant was the "more articulate" of the two;
that she had "a better presence"; and was "more personally secure in her capabilities, her
intellect, her talents and her self sufficiency and reliance" than was Williams (R. 559).
Indeed, defendant is a Michigan State University graduate, and has "substantial
experience in the economic world in earning money and running businesses" (R. 557-58).
Concerning the instant drug transaction, the trial court found that Williams
called defendant five different times on 20 January 1996. While the first phone call was
not drug related, the last four phone calls were drug related (R. 560-61). Williams did not
ask defendant to sell her methamphetamine based on any claim of "desperate illness,"
5

"sympathy," "pity or close personal friendship". Rather, "if there was an appeal made, it
was on the basis of [Williams] offering an economic inducement" in light of defendant's
financial needs (R. 560-61). Williams also mentioned approaching defendant's sister (R.
565).
The trial court further found that defendant had previously told Williams
that she was "no longer in the business", particularly in light of the 5 January 1996,
seizure of drugs and cash from her home. However, Williams and defendant discussed
doing $400 worth of business; specifically, Williams would purchase four grams of
methamphetamine and defendant would realize a $200 profit. Ultimately, defendant
agreed to sell defendant two grams of methamphetamine for $200 (R. 561).3
Turning to the facts of the drug deal itself, the trial court found that
Williams and defendant met in the parking lot of a local supermarket; that defendant
removed two packages of methamphetamine from her bra; that defendant threw the
packages into the back seat of her car; that Williams placed $200 in a grocery bag on the

3

Defendant testified that while she told Williams she was then "out of
business", she "would see if there was something available" (R. 441). Initially, Williams
and defendant discussed doing $400 worth of business, but Williams reduced the dollar
amount once defendant indicated her willingness to do the deal: "She did change the
dollar amount, and I told her that, you know, since I wasn't in business anyway and if I
had to go find it, what did she want" (R. 442-43).
The Fifth phone call, finalizing the details of the transaction, was taped and
introduced in the proceedings below (R. 294-95, 308,444). The tape has not been
included in the record on appeal.

6

floor of the back seat area; and that Williams then took the two baggies, eventually
turning them over to St. George police (R. 562).
Based on the above, the trial court ultimately concluded that defendant was
not entrapped by Williams (R. 563). The "pivotal fact" for the trial court was that even
"as the economic inducement" for a person of defendant's "vulnerability reduced"froma
$200 to a $100 profit, she persisted in completing the drug deal (R. 569).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under the facts presented at the entrapment hearing, the trial court properly
determined that defendant was not entrapped. The State's confidential informant, Terri
Williams, merely afforded defendant an opportunity to sell methamphetamine at its
market value, and defendant took advantage of that opportunity. Defendant, who
concedes that she was not entrapped by any conduct on the part of Williams, otherwise
fails to support her claims of entrapment with cites to the record and/or case authority and
they should therefore be rejected.
As for defendant's claims that the trial court abdicated its fact-finding role,
it is unsupported and also fails to demonstrate any error unfavorable to defendant. To the
extent defendant is challenging the sufficiency of the supporting evidence, she has not
marshaled the evidence.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT MAKES NO CLAIM OF ERROR
REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S APPLICATION
OF OBJECTIVE ENTRAPMENT TEST
Point I of defendant's brief merely asserts that entrapment issues are
determined under an objective test. Aplt. Br. 15-21. See State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496,
503 (Utah 1979) (acknowledging that earlier adopted subjective test was "specifically
rejected by the legislature"). Because defendant does not assert that the trial court misapplied the objective test set forth in Taylor, nor otherwise claim error in Point I, the State
makes no response thereto.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF ENTRAPMENT ARE
UNDERMINED BY HER CONCESSIONS ON APPEAL,
ARE INADEQUATELY BRIEFED, AND/OR
UNPRESERVED AND IGNORE CONTROLLING CASE
AUTHORITY
Defendant's Concession. In Point II of her brief, defendant concedes that
the State's confidential informant, Terri Williams, did not entrap her into selling
methamphetamine on 20 January 1996
based upon claims of physical or psychological need or upon
any other basis which would have arguably aroused feelings
of sympathy or pity. She (Williams) did not declare that
[defendant] should feel some sense of obligation based upon
her personal relationship with Williams. She (Williams) did
8

not tell Appellant that she was going to be rich.
Aplt. Br. at 25-26.
Rather, defendant claims that she was entrapped based on the facts that she
considered Williams a close personal friend, she needed the money, and she was afraid
that Williams would do the drug deal with her sister. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. To the extent
that defendant's concessions do not belie her claims of entrapment, her claims are
inadequately briefed and/or unpreserved and ignore controlling authority.
Inadequate Briefing. Rule 24(a) (9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
requires that the argument portion of an appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds
for reviewing any issues not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied." Under this rule, Utah appellate courts decline to
consider arguments that are not adequately supported by authority and analysis.4
This Court should decline to consider Point II of defendant's brief because
she has failed to comply with rule 24(a)(9). Defendant cites no supporting authority; nor

4

See, e.g., State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989); State v.
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah
App. 1996); State v. Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1100 n.3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied,
913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 (Utah App. 1994);
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648,652 n.2 (Utah App, 1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247,
248-50 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345,1351 (Utah App. 1991); State v.
Coyer, 814 P.2d 604,613 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,125 n.2 (Utah
App. 1991); State v. Pascoe, 114 P.2d 512, 514 n.l (Utah App. 1989).
9

has she grounded her claims with citations to the record. See Aplt. Br. at 26-27. Under
the authorities cited in n.4, supra, this Court should therefore decline to reach defendant's
claims that she was entrapped by herfriendshipwith Williams, her need for money, and
her concern that Williams would do the deal with her sister.
Waiver. An additional ground for not reaching defendant's claim regarding her
concern that Williams would involve her sister is that this issue was not preserved below.
In her statement of relevant facts, defendant cites the record (R. 433-335,437,439-440,
540, 561) for the propositions that her sister was "very vulnerable" and that she was
"apparently disturbed by the thought of her sister being compromised on any level." Aplt.
Br. at 10. Defendant further asserts that her concern for her sister was "apparently what it
took to motivate [her]" to participate in the drug deal. Id. Finally, defendant asserts that
she was upset, upon finding out that Williams had been talking to her sister on the phone
on the day of the drug deal, citing (R. 446). Aplt. Br. at 11-12.
The above record cites do not support these propositions. The most that can
be said is that defendant testified she "was concerned why [defendant] would want to
even involve [her] sister" in the drug deal (R. 434-335); and that she did not want her
sister involved (R. 439). Moreover, the record does not preclude an inference that
defendant's reluctance to have her sister involved in the deal could just have easily been
her desire to keep the profit from William's drug business to herself (R. 434-335,439).
Ultimately, defendant did not rely upon any argument relating to her sister
10

in explaining her theory of entrapment to the trial court. Rather, defendant's entrapment
claim was premised exclusively on the nature of herfriendshipwith Williams (R. 541544). Other than finding that Williams had contacted defendant's sister, the trial court,
accordingly, did not address this issue. Defendant argues no exception to the preservation
requirement on appeal. The argument is therefore not subject to review under any
standard. State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989) (requiring "some form
of specific preservation of claims of error [below] before an appellate court will review
such claim on appeal11), habeas corpus dismissed, 1997 Utah LEXIS 86 (Utah 1997);
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (where appellant does not argue
that "exceptional circumstances or "plain error" justifies review of an unpreserved issue,
the reviewing court will decline to consider it on appeal).
Meritless Claims. Defendant's claims regarding her financial need and
friendship with Williams were arguably preserved below (R. 541-544). Even assuming,
however, these claims can survive defendant's appellate concessions and inadequate
briefing, they lack merit. First, defendant does not contest the trial court's finding that as
her potential profit decreased from $200 to $100, she persisted in arranging and
completing the drug transaction with Williams (R. 561-562), addendum A. This finding
is well supported by defendant's own testimony (R. 442-443). More importantly,
defendant's allegation of personal financial need fails to suggest that she was entrapped
by Williams' conduct. The pertinent question for entrapment law purposes, is not how
11

badly defendant needed the money, but whether Williams persuaded or induced defendant
to commit the drug offense by means which would be effective to persuade an average
person, "other than one who was merely given the opportunity to commit the offense."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(1) (1995); State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1,2 (Utah App. 1995)
("The objective standard focuses solely on the actions of the government, and not on the
defendant's predisposition, to determine whether entrapment has occurred."), cert
denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). Williams' offer to purchase two grams of
methamphetamine for the "retail" price of $200, netting defendant a $100 profit, is not an
inducement that would persuade an average person, other than one who was merely given
the opportunity to commit the offense.
Second,friendshipis by itself an insufficient basis upon which to establish
entrapment. Beddoes, 890 P.2d at 3 ("Utah courts have held, however, that friendship
alone does not constitute entrapment"). See also State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685, 688-89
(Utah App. 1993); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 707 (Utah App. 1993); State v.
Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989). To establish entrapment on the basis of
friendship, defendant must demonstrate that Williams exploited the relationship in an
appeal to her sympathy or pity. Beddoes, 890 P.2d at 3 (citing Taylor, 599 P.2d at 49899, 503-04). As noted previously, defendant expressly disavows that Williams exploited
theirfriendshipfor the purpose of entrapping her into selling methamphetamine. Aplt.
Br. at 25-26.
12

POINT III
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ABDICATED ITS FACT-FINDING ROLE AND
INCORRECTLY VIEWED THE EVIDENCE BELOW
ARE UNSUPPORTED IN THE RECORD
In Point III of her brief defendant broadly asserts that she was "denfied]...
the opportunity of having a law-trained trier of fact make an independent determination of
the entrapment issue." Aplt. Br. at 31. Defendant suggests that the trial court failed to
recognize the scope of its role in the entrapment proceeding; specifically, that the court
abdicated its fact-finding role. Aplt. Br. at 31-32. Defendant fails to ground her claim in
the record and it should be rejected on that ground. Price, 827 P.2d at 250; Amicone, 689
P.2d at 1344. Moreover, her claim is not supportable in the record: the trial court clearly
entered detailed factual findings (R. 552-563, 565, 568), see addendum B.
Alternatively, defendant asserts that even if the trial court "made its own
findings . . . it viewed the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to [defendant]." Aplt. Br. at 32. Defendant suggests that this
"clearly indicates that the court did not undertake to decide the case as the trier of fact."
Id. Defendant fails to ground this argument in case authority. Price, 827 P.2d at 250;
Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344. Nor does she explain how the alleged error, viewing the
evidence below in the light most favorable to her entrapment claim, was unfavorable.
See, e.g., Shurtieffv. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168,1172 (Utah 1980) (holding no

13

ground for reversal where any prejudice caused by erroneous jury instruction was
favorable to the defendant).
Further, defendant asserts that she was entitled to a favorable entrapment
ruling, "if any reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that she had been entrapped."
Aplt. Br. at 32. Defendant similarly fails to ground this claim in case authority. Price,
827 P.2d at 250; Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344. Moreover, as set forth in Point I, her
entrapment claims are unsupported by record or by case authority.
In any event, contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court in an
entrapment hearing performs a gatekeeping function. A pretrial motion to dismiss on the
grounds of entrapment is similar to a motion to dismiss at the close of the evidence at
trial: in the face of "lack of certainty as to the conclusion to be drawnfromthe conflicting
evidence" the trial court should "refuse[] to rule as a matter of law that the defendant was*
entrapped and submit[] that issue to the jury." State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164, 166 (Utah
1978).
Finally, to the extent defendant's claim can be read as a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence in the support of the trial court's ruling that she was not
entrapped, defendant wholly fails to marshal the supporting evidence. State v. Drobel,
815 P.2d 724,734 (Utah App. 1991) ("An appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must,
under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings,
and then show that evidence to be insufficient."), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
14

1991).
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court should uphold the trial court's finding that
defendant was not entrapped and should also affirm her conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted o n ^ f o January 1998.
MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

(AN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on^CL January 1998,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to:
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight, & Esplin
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Attorney for Appellant
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GARY W. PENDIJETON (2564)
Attorney for Defendant
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St George, Utah 84770
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]>

NOTICEOFENTRAPMENTDEFENSE
AND MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY
HEARING

}

Case No. 961500846 FS

]1

Judge James L. Shumate

vs.
HEATHER BERLIN,
Defendant

Defendant contends that the state's now-disclosed informant unfairly and
improperly used her personal relationship with defendant, her knowledge of defendant's dire
financial circumstances, and the impending eviction of the defendant and her children in an
attempt to induce the defendant to acquire and deliver methamphetamine. Defendant
hereby gives notice that she intends to assert entrapment as an "affirmative" defense. This
notice is not to be construed as an admission of any criminal misconduct on the part of the
defendant See. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(3).

Defendant hereby moves the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and
determine that, as a matter of fact and law, the defendant was entrapped.
DATED this

/

day of Octoh*r,1996.
Gary W. Pfcndletonj
Attorney forDeferidant

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on the 1
day of October, 1996,1 did personally
deliver a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing notice and motion to Wade A.
Farraway, Deputy Washington County Attorney at 178 North 200 East, St. George, Utah
84770.
Secretary
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
DEFENDANTS MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ON
HEARING RE: ENTRAPMENT (AND
IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS Ml^ffiJE)

Plaintiff,
vs.
HEATHER BERLIN,

Case No. 961500846
Defendant

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant presents the following statement of points and authorities for the
court's review and consideration in connection with the evidentiary hearing which is to be
conducted in the above-entitled matter pursuant to defendant's notice of her intention to
raise the defense of entrapment Should the state's case survive the court's ruling on said
hearing, evidentiary issues will need to be addressed at the threshold of any proceeding
conducted before a jury and accordingly this memorandum is filed in support of motions jn.
Hmjne which are filed herewith or may be filed hereafter.

1

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
POINT I
UNDER UTAH LAW, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR
NOT A DEFENDANT HAS BEEN ENTRAPPED IS
DETERMINED BY AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE
POLICE TACTICS EMPLOYED, NOT A DEFENDANTS
PREDISPOSITION TO COMMIT CRIME.
Generally speaking, there are two rules or tests which are commonly applied
in the various jurisdictions of the United States in determining whether or not a defendant
has been unfairly entrapped in the commission of an offense. These are the subjective test
and the objective test
Under the subjective test, there are two inquiries:

(1) Was there an

inducement on the part of the government? and (2) If so, did the defendant show any
predisposition to commit the offense? §eg 62 A.LR.3d 110, Anno.: Modern Status of Law
Concerning Entrapment to Commit Narcotics Offense - State cases, §2(a), p. 114.
Under the objective test, the focus is not on the propensities and
predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police tactics employed fall
below commonly accepted notions concerning the proper use of governmental authority.
See State v. Tavlor. 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979).
This concept establishes entrapment on its historical basis; the
refusal to countenance a perversion of justice by government
misconduct The objective view provides a solid definitive
standard upon which the defense can rest, Le., does the conduct
of the government comport with a fair and honorable
administration of justice?

cz

Under the objective view, the defense does not deprive the
police of the use of decoys to afford a person an opportunity to
commit crime; however it does deny the use of decoys to
present actively, inducements for the purpose of luring a person
into the commission of an offense. The government is not
permitted to engage in the manufacture of crime. The prime
duty of the government's law enforcement agencies is the
prevention of crime through the apprehension of those antisocial persons who, without inducement, are engaged in the
commission of crime.
Id.
Not so long ago, the concept of the government inducing the commission of
a public offense was almost unthinkable. In State v. McComkh. 59 Utah 58, 201 P. 637
(1921), the Utah Supreme Court articulated an objective test by which the issue of
entrapment was to be determined.
Policeman are conservators of the peace. It is their duty to
prevent crime, not to instigate and encourage its commission.
Nothing can be more reprehensible than to induce the
commission of crime for the purpose of apprehending and
convicting the perpetrator. To advise or encourage a criminal
act is itself a crime. Comp. Laws Utah, §7919. In his zeal and
anxiety to apprehend some one in a criminal act, this city
detective deliberately planned and induced the commission of
an offense which otherwise would not have been committed by
anyone.
By these strictures we do not intend to criticize the good
services rendered by faithful policemen, generally, but, in the
language of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Connor v.
People. 18 Colo. 373, 33 Pac 159, 25 USJL 341, 36 Am. St
Rep. 295:
We do say that when in their zeal, or under a
mistaken sense of duty, detectives suggest the
commission in order to arrest them while in the
3
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act, although the purpose may be to capture old
offenders, their conduct is not only reprehensible,
but criminal, and ought to be rebuked rather than
encouraged by the courts.
I& at 65-66 (emphasis added). See also, Salt Lake Citv v. Robinson. 40 Utah 448,125 P.
654 (1912) (objective view of entrapment adopted). Note: Connor is misquoted in Tavlor.
599 P.2d at 501.
However, apparently concerned that someone who was predisposed and
indeed ready to commit an offense may escape punishment if cases were decided by
reference to the propriety or impropriety of police tactics alone, the Utah Supreme Court
articulated the law of entrapment to include the examination of lfthe defendant's attitude of
mind.M See State v. Pacheco. 13 Utah 2d 148,151, 369 P.2d 494, 496 (1962). In so doing
the court in substance and effect concluded that "a line must be drawn between the trap for
the unweaiy innocent and the trap for the unweaiy criminal.11 See Taylor. 599 P.2d at 501.
Eleven years later, the Legislature enacted §76-2-303(1) as a part of the
comprehensive revision of the Utah Criminal Code. See Laws of Utah 1973, ch. 196, §76-2303. This section has not been revised since its enactment It follows the format and theory
(objective) set forth in §2.13(1) of the Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (1962).
The Utah statute, in relevant part, reads:
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of the
commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial
risk that the offense would he committed by one not otherwise
ready to commit it.

4

Emphasis added. The statute further states that the government does not entrap an
individual by merely affording hfai "an opportunity to commit an offense.*1 The concept of
"inducement" is discussed below.
In Tentative Draft No. 9, this section of the model code included the objective
test as one of two alternative proposals. Interestingly, the subjective test enjoyed "top
billing." Finally, the American Law Institute endorsed the objective test when the Proposed
Official Draft was adopted.
While there is little room for serious argument concerning the appropriate
interpretation of the language adopted by the Legislature and codified as §76-2-303, the
Utah Supreme Court "stubbornly adhered to the subjective test, predisposition of the
defendant,11 for six years after the criminal code was recodified. See Taylor. 599 P.2d at 501.
Cf. State v. Hansen. 588 P.2d 164 (1978). It was not until the court handed down its
decision in Taylor that the court examined the language of the statute in the context of the
Model Penal Code provision after which it was patterned and abandoned its efforts to
interpret the entrapment statute by "engraftpng] the case law setting forth the subjective
standard onto a new statute, which by its express terms incorporates the objective standard."
599 P.2d at 499.
In so doing, a majority of the court fully embraced the philosophy that the
defense of entrapment is appropriately invoked to deny a government, which fails to conduct
itself with the dignity of government, the benefit of a conviction which arises out of its own
misconduct and to do so whether or not the government can demonstrate the defendant's
5

"predisposition" to commit crime.
Permissible police activity does not vary according to the
particular defendant concerned; surety if two suspects had been
solicited at the same time in the same manner, one should not
go to jail simply because he has been convicted before and is
said to have a criminal disposition. No more does it vary
according to the suspicions, reasonable or unreasonable, of the
police concerning the defendant's activities. Appeals to
sympathy, friendship, the possibility of exuberant gain, and so
forth, can no more be tolerated when directed against a past
offender than against the ordinary law abiding citizen
Past
crimes do not forever outlaw the criminal and open him to
police practices, aimed at securing his repeated conviction, from
which the ordinary citizen is protected. The whole ameliorative
hopes of modern penology and prison administration strongly
counsel against such a view.
Id. at 502 (quoting Sherman v. United States. 356 U.S. 369, 382-383 (1958)).
The objective test provides "a solid definitive standard" against which the
conduct of the police and their criminal operatives may be judged regardless of who they
decide to target Moreover, the application of such a standard renders a defendant's
"predisposition" to commit crime completely irrelevant in evaluating the conduct of the
police. Because the defendant's character is not an issue on any level, the evidentiary and
due process issues, which arose in the context of attempting to prove the defendant's
predisposition to commit crime, have been eliminated. Cf. State v. Hansen. 588 P.2d at 16869 (EUett, CJ., and Hall, J., dissenting). Simply stated, no matter who the government is
dealing with, it must govern, not induce or lure the imweary "innocent" or the unweary
"guilty" into the commission of public offenses.
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POINT n
METHODS WHICH HCREAT[E] A SUBSTANTIAL RISK"
OF INDUCING THE ORDINARY CITIZEN ARE
IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL.
While the government has a legitimate interest in identifying and punishing
those who are violating the law, it by no means has a legitimate interest in identifying and
punishing those who can, by artifice or trickery, be seduced into a violation of the law. Any
plan or scheme, which successfully identifies the former and at the same time creates a
"substantial risk" of including the latter, is invalid and illegal. The objective test of
entrapment rejects the notion that these two types of "offenders" can be sorted out after the
fact.
"Substantialrisk"of inducement The issue is not whether or not the question/bolice tactics
would induce the "average" or "ordinary" law-abiding citizen to commit an offense. The
question is whether or not the tactics created a "substantial risk" that an offense would be
committed by one not otherwise ready to engage in criminal activity, Le., whether or not the
act was that of the defendant's free will or induced by another. State v. Cripps. 692 P.2d 747
(Utah 1984).
Realistically, an average person or ordinary citizen is not a
former drug addict, will not be begged by a former lover to
obtain drugs, does not have any notion of how to reach people
who sell drugs, would probably not befriend the sort of stranger
who turns out to be an undercover narcotics agent, and could
not imagine circumstances short of physical threats that would
prompt him to obtain marijuana to sell Unquestionably, the
circumstances of each defendant should be considered in

relation to the police conduct
Id. at 749-50.
Character of solicitation.

Beginning with Tavlor. 599 P.2d at 503, and consistently

thereafter, the Utah appellate courts have held that appeals based upon sympathy, pity,
close personal relationships, and greed are suspect These are appeals which create a
substantial risk of inducing a response from one not otherwise ready to commit an offense.
Tavlor presented an outrageous scenario involving entrapment using a police
informant who had a close personal, indeed a sexual, relationship with the defendant and
who appealed to the defendant for assistance in acquiring heroine because she was suffering
the pangs of withdrawal The defendant had recently suffered withdrawal from the drug
himself. There was no evidence of repeated solicitations. Apparently, the defendant had
immediately responded to his former lover's request
The reported cases which followed Taylor were set against quite a different
factual background. In State v. Kourbelas. 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), the supreme court
found the following factors to establish entrapment as a matter of fact and law: (1) the
undercover agent was the party who brought up the subject of controlled substances; (2) the
undercover agent was the one who renewed contact with the defendant, contacting him on
at least five occasions for the purpose of soliciting the purchase of marijuana; and (3) while
there were no appeals tofriendship,loyalty, pity, or sympathy, the undercover agent had
indicated that "a lot of money" could be made if he could get some marijuana for
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distribution in the Lake Powell area. What the case lacked in terms suspect solicitations,
it apparently made up for in terms of the number of solicitations initiated by the undercover
agent before the defendant took the bait
Repetition of solicitation.

Although the Utah reported cases have repeatedly recited a

litany of examples of solicitations which are considered to be outrageous or overreaching in
their subject matter or context, these cases do not discuss the psychological effect that
repeated solicitations can have upon someone who really has no desire to engage in criminal
conduct Depending on the personalities involved, wearing someone down through repeated
solicitations or invitations may indeed be a more effective methodology than is an outrageous
solicitation which appeals to loyalty, lust, or greed.
We have received little guidance concerning when a solicitation, not
outrageous in its content or context, constitutes entrapment because it is outrageous in the
frequency of its repetition. In State v. Sprague. 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), the undercover
agent solicited the defendant three times. The defendant did not appear to be troubled or
insulted by any of these solicitations. On thefirstoccasion the defendant suggested that the
undercover agent's fvbest bet" would be to go to Provo. He gave the agent his name and
telephone number stating that the officer could call him later.

During the second

solicitation, the defendant stated that he was going to Gunnison that night and might be able
to get some marijuana at that time; he never made the trip. The defendant provided the
marijuana during the third solicitation, but had to leave the cafe and obtain the substance

9
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from someone else who returned to the cafe with the defendant and apparently made any
profit which may have been realized in the transaction.
The defendant was apparently motivated by a desire to become the undercover
agent's friend. Obviously the desire to develop afriendshipwith an undercover agent or
confidential informant is quite a different thing than is the use of an existing relationship to
demand allegiance or loyalty. Again, what the entrapment defense lacked by way of
outrageous solicitations, it made up by way of repeated solicitations. The court concluded
that "the offense was induced by the persistant requests of [the undercover agent] not by the
initiative and desire of defendant" Id. at 406. A dimension of the Sprague decision which
is not apparent from reading the opinion itself is found in State v. Martin. 713 P.2d 60, 62
(Utah 1986), where the supreme court indicated that the facts and circumstances of Sprague
demonstrated the presence of "extreme vulnerability.11 See also Cripps. 692 P.2d at 749-50
(police agent promised unemployed defendant he could find defendant a job).
In State v. Udell 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court handed
down a decision which, at first blush, appeared to sound a retreat to the subjective test for
entrapment. In that case neither the subject matter nor the context of the solicitations was
such as would be considered likely to induce the commission of a public offense, however,
police agents had solicited the defendant four times before he provided any substance.
At the time of the first of these solicitations, the defendant did not have airy
cocaine to sell, but told the undercover agent where the agent could purchase some. Before
the officer left the defendant's apartment he had purchased cocaine, apparently from
10

someone living there with the defendant, and shared some of it with the defendant Upon
the next solicitation, the defendant again indicated that he did not have any cocaine to sell
and again directed the officer to a specific source for the purchase of the substance. When
he was solicited the third time, the defendant agreed to have the officer return the following
day. The next day, the fourth solicitation, a transaction was consummated
The supreme court refused to interfere with a jury verdict finding that the
defendant had not been entrapped. The court noted that the defendant had demonstrated
by his conduct that he used cocaine, that he was aware of local drug marketing activities, and
that he welcomed future contacts on the subject of drug trafficking. "All of these factors
indicate that the police conduct was within reasonable bounds under the circumstances." Id.
at 133.
While Udell may initially appear to signal a return to the subjective test of
entrapment, it must be bom in mind that none of the police solicitations, in their content
or context, approached any of the suspect categories which the Utah appellate courts have
repeatedly identified. In UdelL the alleged entrapment was based soley upon the number
of solicitations. Each solicitation drew a response which certainty did not discourage further
inquiiy.
Sprague and Cripps stand for the proposition that special circumstances in the
life of an ordinary law-abiding citizen may render that person unsualty vulnerable to certain
types of appeals or persistant solicitations. Such circumstances are properly considered in
determining whether or not police tactics created a "substantial risk.19
11

POINT m
WHERE THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
SUPPORTING A FINDING OF ENTRAPMENT, THE
STATE BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPED AND MUST
PROVE IT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
At this pretrial evidentiary entrapment hearing, as in a trial by jury, if evidence
is presented which indicates that police agents solicited the commission of the offense and
that such solicitations (1) were made by someone in a close personal relationship with the
defendant, or (2) were of such a character or were made in such a context as would appeal
to one not otherwise ready to commit an offense, or (3) were made repeatedly, the state
must assume the burden of proving that the defendant was not entrapped and must prove
it beyond a reasonable doubt
It is sometimes said that when it is shown that the accused
actually committed the offense (as here), the claim of
entrapment is an affirmative defense which must be proved by
the evidence somewhat analogous to the plea of confession and
avoidance. But it is also to be kept in mind that the burden of
proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is
always upon the state: both initially and ultimately. Therefore,
the only requirement on the defense of entrapment is that it be
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant freely
and voluntarily committed the crime.
Accordingly, when the problem of entrapment is present, the
inquiry focuses upon two propositions: (1) Does it appear
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was the product of
the defendant's voluntary will and desire to commit it; or (2),
Was the crime induced or motivated by the actions of the
prosecution. If the evidence relating to the second proposition
raises a reasonable doubt as to the first, then there can be no
12
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conviction of the crime.
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746-47 (Utah 1975)(footnotes omitted). Sge ajso Tavlor. 599
P.2d at 504-05 (foregoing language used as jury instruction).
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in reversing the conviction in Kourbelas:
[I]f the rule as to the presumption of innocence is fairly and
properly applied, there necessarily exists a reasonable doubt as
to whether the offense committed was the product of the
defendant's initiative desire or was induced by the persistent
requests of [the police agent]. Accordingly, it is our conclusion
that the defendant's conviction should be reversed.
621 P.2d at 1240.
At this stage of the proceedings, the court is the trier of fact See §76-2-303
(4). The court does not determine whether or not the state has presented sufficient
evidence from which a jury of reasonable persons may conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant was not entrapped The court must determine at this proceeding whether
or not it finds, as a matter of "fact and law" and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was not entrapped. If the court finds and concludes beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was not entrapped, the defendant is allowed to present the issue to the
jury for its determination. See §76-2-303(5). !£ on the other hand, the court, as the trier
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of fact, concludes that the defendant was entrapped or that there is a reasonable doubt as
to whether or not she was entrapped,
ntrapi
the prosecution is terminated at this point
DATED this

/ _ day

/emt

Gaiy Wl Pendleton /
AttomeyfeiJQfiWdant
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

i

I do hereby certify that on the
(_ day of November, 1996,1 did personally
deliver a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Appearance to Wade A.
Farraway, Deputy Washington County Attorney, a^ 178 North 200 East, St. George, Utah
84770.
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the Court.

2

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Counsel,

3

you have each given me substantial food for

4

thought.

5

back on the bench at 4:30 with my findings and

6

decision after I review the law and the facts. So

7

keep yourselves available.

I am going to take a recess.

I'll come

I'll come back at 4:30.

8

(Recess.)

9

THE COURT: We are back in session in

10

State versus Heather Berlin.

11

present, together with her counsel.

12

represented by Mr. Farraway.

13

The defendant is
State is

As I have indicated before, the Court, at

14

this stage in the proceedings, must draw every

15

reasonable inference from the testimony amd evidence

16

offered by the defense in favor of the proposition

17

offered by the defense.

18

I have gleaned my memory of the testimony

19

of the last two days, have reviewed my own notes and

20

have applied that standard in drawing every

21

reasonable inference especially as to critical facts

22

from this matter basically taking as conclusively

23

proven the defendant's version of her relationship

24

with the confidential informant Ms. Williams/

25

Hoskey.
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Based upon that analysis, and this is not
a full analysis, after the State having rested, I
then applied the factors most recently outlined by
Judge Bench in the State versus Beddoes case which
quote from Taylor and Richardson the following
language, and it bears well to put it on the record
here talking about the objective standard and the
analysis that a court must use in an entrapment
defense.
I quote at page 3 of 890 Pacific 2.d
bottom of the left-hand column, Under the objective
standard the pivotal questions are, number one, does
the conduct of the government comport with fair and
honorable administration of justice, and, two, did
the governmental conduct conduct a -- make that, did
the governmental conduct create a substantial risk
that an average person would be induced to commit
the crime the defendant committed.
Then it goes on, but let me stop here and
use again another analysis which I must from the
language in State versus Cripps. We are not talking
about an average person.

The reality shown in

Cripps and the reality of the drug situation that we
are dealing with here says that the Court must not
look at an average person, but, frankly, must look
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at an average drug dealer, an average drug user at
least, a person who understands and deals with the
drug culture, a person who understands where drugs
might become available, a person who understands
what drugs might cost, a person who understands the
security measures taken by those in the drug
business to avoid things like surveillance and the
hazards faced by ones engaged in that activity.
So where the court of appeals has used
this average person language, it's really -(inaudible.)

One must look at it from the average

drug user, average drug dealer, whichever the
appropriate case may be, and I must intertwine
Cripps language --or State versus Cripps language
in there.
Then it goes on in the Beddoes case.
Examples of what might constitute improper police
conduct are extreme pleas of desperate illness or
appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close
personal friendship or offers of inordinate sums of
money.

That is basically from Taylor.
It goes on to state, Taylor suggests

certain factors to consider when evaluating the
conduct between the government representative and a
defendant, the transactions leading up to the
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1

offense.

2

defendant, and the response to the inducements of

3

the agent are all to be considered in judging what

4

the effect of the governmental agent's conduct would

5

be on a normal person.

6

The interaction between the agent and the

Now, the Court, in view of that language

7

from Taylor, has allowed this defendant and the

8

presentation of the defendant's case in chief on

9

this motion to suppress substantially broader

10

latitude than the State thought that the Court

11

should have.

12

from Taylor is clear and that I must examine all of

13

these facts and circumstances.

14

However, I believe that the message

Of all of the authorities submitted by

15

counsel for both parties to the Court which do focus

16

upon the objective standard, no one has submitted to

17

me anything pre-Taylor for good cause since Taylor

18

is the watershed case in this area.

19

There is one fact circumstance that

20

appears to be a case of first impression to the

21

State of Utah and that is a circumstance where the

22

defendant, as is claimed here, and which the Court

23

must examine and make factual findings regarding,

24

where the defendant is particularly, perhaps

25

uniquely vulnerable to inducements by the State, and
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I use the word inducements because the supreme court
used it in Taylor.
There is nothing inappropriate about
inducements.

It is the level of inducement.

It is

the level of activity smd whether or not that indeed
offends fair and honorable administration of
justice.
Entrapment cases just like search and
seizure cases are extremely fact sensitive and while
my boiling down of these facts into my following
findings might make everyone ask, why did we spend
two days taking the evidence to get here, I don't
know of any other way, and I compliment both counsel
for their thoroughness in getting here.

It may have

been tedious but without it the Court could not
reach these findings.
I focus upon this defendant's
circumstance, and as Taylor has indicated, the
interaction between this defendant and Ms.
Williams/Hoskey, the transactions leading up to the
offense, and this defendant's response to the
inducements of Ms. Hoskey.
The Court finds as follows:

On the 20th

of January, 1996, this defendant was 43 years old.
She was separated from her husband receiving no
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support from him and raising two children based upon
her own means.
She was receiving as public assistance
approximately $700 per month, which was deposited
directly into a bank account.
bank account by check.

She could access that

She has testified that she

had no check blanks.
She could access that bank account by
horizon card, which, as I understand from the
defendant's testimony, is basically a debit card
against that bank account, and she could access that
account by ATM, automatic teller machine,
dispensing, as we all know, $20 bills in
denominations.
On the 20th of January of 1996, this
defendant had been previously 15 days earlier the
subject of a search warrant in which drugs and cash
were seized from her residence in excess of six
grams of methamphetamine and approximately $600 in
cash, some of which the defendant has testified
constituted drug money and some of which constituted
public assistance money.
On the 20th of January, 1996, this
defendant was a graduate of Michigan State
University with a bachelor's degree -- bachelor's of
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1

science degree in business and a very substantial

2

experience in the economic world in earning money

3

and running businesses.

4

On this date, the 20th of January, 1996,

5

this defendant did not own a motor vehicle.

6

to that time she had been able to borrow cars from

7

friends.

8

Ms. Williams/Hoskey for some rides for herself and

9

her children.

10 I

Prior

She had depended on the agent, informant

On that date she was in the process of

11

purchasing a car from one Ms. Leonard and Ms.

12

Leonard's mother, this same Ms. Leonard being a

13

person with whom this defendant had familiarity in

14

the drug culture.

15

Following her arrest on the 5th of January

16

of 1996, this defendant had received financial

17

assistance from her family, not her estranged

18

husband, in order to obtain counsel and to make

19

bail.

20

On the 20th of July -- January of 1996,

21

this defendant had previously been made aware of,

22

appeared on an additional controlled substance

23

charge on the 17th of January of 1996. The Court

24

can only presume, and because of the motion to

25

dismiss and the present posture, the Court must
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presume that the State's informant, Ms.
Williams/Hoskey was aware of all of these facts and
circumstances in the life of this defendant.
The less tangible findings of the Court,
the ones which the Court takes into account, and, I
think, must regarding the interactions between the
agent and this defendant, Ms. Berlin, were that the
two had shared conversations on intimate and
personal subjects regarding difficulties in each of
their lives on many occasions prior to the 20th of
January of 1996.
The Court has had the opportunity to
observe the defendant in court testifying and Ms.
Williams/Hoskey in court testifying.
is more articulate than Ms. Hoskey.

This defendant
This defendant

has a better presence than Ms. Hoskey in court.
This defendant has a better command of times, dates,
places than Ms. Hoskey in court. And the Court, in
making this observation, finds that this defendant
shows the appearance of being more personally secure
in her capabilities, her intellect, her talents and
her self sufficiency and reliance.
On the 20th of January of 1996# this
defendant had received a notice of eviction from her
home that she had lived in since prior to
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Thanksgiving of 1995, a period of time, at the time
she was evicted, not much more than six or seven
weeks.

That also was known by Ms. Hoskey.
The Court further finds, based upon the

inferences that I must draw, that on the 20th of
January of 1996 five telephone calls were made by
Ms. Williams/Hoskey to this defendant.

The purchase

of methamphetamine and a transaction to exchange
money for methamphetamine was discussed in at least
the last four phone calls.

Of that I am absolutely

certain.
The first phone call was not so
drug-related, but the Court further finds that the
discussion of the drugs, as related by this
defendant, who is, on this issue, the more credible
of the two witnesses, was not based upon specific
need of this agent.
The agent did not claim desperate illness,
make appeals based on sympathy or pity or close
personal friendship on the basis of the need of the
informant, rather, if there was an appeal made, it
was on the basis of the informant offering an
economic inducement towards the needs of this
defendant and based upon this defendant's vulnerable
circumstance.
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The Court specifically finds that the
offer to purchase drugs made by the agent to this
defendant was extended as a means of assisting and
aiding this defendant in a circumstance of financial
need.
The Court specifically finds that in the
initial conversations, the first, second, or third,
and I think it was the second, the record will bear
out which one because I am depending strictly upon
the testimony of Ms. Berlin, that the quantity of
the sale proposed was $400 for four grams of
methamphetamine.

That would have realized a profit

to this defendant of $200.

Parties discussed the

sale would be retail meaning specifically the $400
price for four grams.
While this defendant had on earlier
occasions indicated to Ms. Williams Hoskey that she
was no longer in the business, certainly not in the
business following the arrest and search warrant of
January the 5th, in subsequent conversations after
the first mention of $400 for four grams, this
defendant apparently agreed for a lesser inducement
of $200 for two grams to consummate the
transaction.
The Court focuses interestingly enough
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upon that fact because it is unique in that the
level of inducement, the level of economic benefit
to this defendant and the intensity of this
defendant's need appeared to have no relationship to
the decision to engage in the transaction.

As the

volume of the sale went down and the profit to the
defendant went down, it was still agreed that the
sale would take place.
The Court further finds that on the
evening hours of January 20th of 1996 the sale, in
fact, did take place in the parking lot of the Lin's
supermarket in western St. George, and that at that
time and place, as related by this defendant, this
defendant removed two packages of methamphetamine
from her brassiere, threw them on to the back seat
of the vehicle in which she was riding, that she was
buying from Ms. Leonard and her mother, and that the
agent placed the $200 purchase price in a grocery
sack on the floor of the back seat which had been
placed there by the defendant.

The agent then

retrieved the two baggies and eventually turned them
over to the police officers under the conditions of
the controlled sale.
These findings made by the Court, as I've
indicated, are placed in the best light possible
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inferring all of the possible inferences in favor of
the defendant's case. Based upon those factual
findings, my analysis of the case law in the state
of Utah, though, again, pointing out that no case
has been submitted to the Court wherein the Utah
appellate courts, either the court of appeals or the
supreme court, have looked at the defendant's
specific economic vulnerability, as this defendant
has demonstrated in this matter, but looking at all
of the other factors, the Court finds that the
motion to dismiss based upon entrapment should be
overruled and denied.

Of course that makes it

possible to bring this issue before the jury, and I
anticipate counsel will do so.
Now, based upon my findings of fact,
analysis of the law, conclusions of the law, Mr.
Farraway, do you see any need to further amplify or
examine any other factors in this analysis or
finding?
MR. FARRAWAY: No, Your Honor.

I think

the Court has adequately looked at all the facts in
this case and has basically explained the details
that have been before the Court today.
THE COURT: Mr. Pendleton, let me inquire
of you, are there specific findings of fact or
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1

matters which you feel the Court should address in

2

order to perfect your record?

3

has been clear enough so that if we get any law on

4

this case, of course maybe a jury will make this be

5

no law at all, but is there anything that you think

6

the Court needs to consider?

7

MR. PENDLETON:

My analysis, I hope,

Your Honor, this -- from

8

this aspect, and I'm very troubled, the Court has

9

looked at one aspect --it seems to me like

10

everything could go either way until we get down to

11

discussing whether or not by the time the amount of

12

this transaction which has been apparently a hundred

13

dollars, whether or not this should be a inducement

14

sufficient that it would cause someone who was not

15

otherwise ready to engage in this kind of conduct to

16

go ahead and engage in it.

17

The Court, first of all, apparently

18

assigns no significance to the fact that Ms. Berlin

19

was apparently induced on a higher level and then

20

after there was some contacts or something made then

21

and then the level of the inducement is drawn back

22

and that the -- the fact -- I don't know how the

23

Court factors the significance of $100 for somebody

24

who doesn't have any money, and I'm concerned about

25

that.
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And the biggest concern I have, Your
Honor, is that we have looked -- now we have looked
only at one thing.

We have looked only at the

nature of the inducement really.

We haven't looked

at the fact of the repeated solicitation.

We

haven't factored that in. We haven't factored in
this specter of, okay, well, I'm out of business,
and so -- okay, well, I'm going to call your sister
and all of these things -THE COURT:

Oh, counsel, you're correct.

Let me make a finding right now to correct that.
The Court does specifically find that in the five
conversations, not the last conversation, which we
have a tape recording of and we know the exact text
of that conversation, but in the four prior
conversations, there was mention of the approach or
the possible approach to the defendant's sister
whose name is Honey Green.
That I specifically find that occurred,
that that was present.

I probably am bound to do so

by the level of analysis the Court must do on motion
to dismiss after close of the defendant's case, but
I am also convinced that such conversation
occurred.

Again, I find Ms. Berlin's testimony much

more clear and convincing on that issue.

So I'll

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING,INC. (801) 652-9971
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702

a?

189
961500846

VOL. II

11-8-96

make that finding as well.
MR. PENDLETON:

And, Your Honor, it

appears to me that the nature of the solicitation,
in other words, the -- somehow the Court has tried
to balance, as a matter of fact, the nature of the
solicitation being the economic gain.
We -- I guess we have assumed that the
economic gain is going to be now $100 when I don't
know that there's even evidence to that effect, that
it is significant to be less. That's an assumption
I guess we have made.

I don't know what the -- what

the gain would have been.

I don't know how much

money Heather Berlin had on that date to function
with, and I don't -THE COURT: Nor does the Court, counsel.
I don't have any evidence on that.
MR. PENDLETON:

That's true.

But other

than the fact that we do have evidence that -- with
apparently no -- well, I won't belabor that.

But

the nature of the inducement seems to me to be the
only thing that we've really considered because we
--we take out of this formula the way -- the way I
see it the fact that this CI repeatedly called in a
period of one day.
Now, maybe there isn't an expression of
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desperation, but it would seem to me that the Court
having made a finding that this person calls five
times within one day, whether or not there's an
expressed --an expression of a need or desperation
or petition appealing to friendship it's at least
implied,
I think that all has to be factored in,
and I don't suggest that that's the need -(inaudible) -- but then also another thing that has
to be factored in is the fact that --if you take
the Cripps case, one factor there the CI or
undercover agent apparently, though it was disputed,
offers some fellow that he has known for very few
minutes or tells him he would be able to get him a
job and this fellow is unemployed and yet that in
and of itself apparently would have been sufficient
to send it to the jury. And I guess that
implication would have been that a jury of
reasonable -- (inaudible) -- could have —

could

have found entrapment.
But see we've taken all of those things
out of the formula because even though there is
nothing stated by this person saying if you don't
play ball with me, I'm -- I'm not going to have
Carrie find that house for you.

There's nothing
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1

implied or stated that if you don't do this, you

2

know, I won't do that.

3

THE COURT:

Counsel, let me give you

4

another finding of fact that you just mentioned.

5

The factual findings should also include that in the

6

relationship between the State's informant and the

7

defendant, the informant offered assistance from a

8

person not known to the defendant, and Ms. Berlin

9

testified clearly that the name Carrie had not been

10

mentioned to her, but did, in fact, offer assistance

11

through some source to seek additional housing for

12

this defendant since she was going to be evicted.

13

That factual finding needs also be put in there

14

because it is part of the milieu from which this

15

setting arose, and it is part of the facts that I

16

considered as well.

17

Counsel, my concern, and I'll put it on

18

the record now, and if I am error --in error, then

19

the court of appeals can tell me, but in all of the

20

cases, the Utah cases that we have used, from Taylor

21

forward, they have all gone back to the statute

22

which specifically states, Officers induce the

23

commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence

24

by methods creating a substantial risk that the

25

offense would be committed by one not otherwise
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ready to commit it, and it is the methods used and
the risk created that the Court is focusing on.
And as you have indicated, counsel, it's
difficult to separate that sometimes, in this case,
from the vulnerability and the needs expressed by
this defendant, but I do find as an irrefutable
problem in this analysis from the defense standpoint
that as the economic inducement for a person of this
vulnerability reduced the decision to go ahead and
engage in the conduct and create the evidence that
constituted the offense still continued and is
brought to fruition.
And I -- I -- I agree with you, Mr.
Pendleton.

I ended up pivoting on that one issue,

but I'm not sure that I know any other way to do
it.

If the courts of appeal of this state want to

give me a different formula using different
procedures and different methods, I invite them to
do so.

This may be a good case in which to do it,

but I'm not sure that I can take any other
conclusions from that, what appears to be me to be a
pivotal fact.
That still doesn't mean you can't bring it
before a jury, and, of course, you can, and they
will listen to you all hopefully in a more efficient
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fashion, but if not, we'll take the time it takes.
At this time I must address this other
item, counsel. Mr. Pendleton, you were involved as
one of the counsel for the litigants in Westerguard
versus Martin which is set on November 18th and 19th
of this month.

I would like to place Ms. Berlin's

case, this case on for trial on those two dates. I
have four days available in which we could try it
beginning Monday, Tuesday and then we could go
Thursday, Friday if needed.

Mr. Farraway, let me

inquire of you, do you have any irredeemable
conflicts on those dates?
MR. FARRAWAY:

I don't have a calendar

before me at this time, Your Honor, so I don't know
that.

I do have some cases coming up.

You know,

obviously, I've been here for the last three days
with you on Edwin Stokes and now this so I -- I
don't know where I stand, whether there's any
conflicts with any other courts.
THE COURT: Well, I'll, of course, see
that you're cleared out because as we all know Ms.
Berlin has been in jail since the 16th of August and
this needs to come to trial. All right, counsel,
let's -MR. PENDLETON:

Your Honor, I would appeal
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1

to the Court to consider reduction of bail in this

2

case.

3

THE COURT:

Frankly, counsel, I am not

4

persuaded.

5

abilities to be sitting in jail, under the facts and

6

her circumstance, I see no other approach.

7

Tragic as it is for a person of this

MR. PENDLETON:

Your Honor, I just want to

8

express something that should be predetermined from

9

the arguments advanced by the State in this case.

10
11
12
13

This is going to be a very dangerous case to try to
-- try to a jury even -- (inaudible) -understand what the public policy issues are.
THE COURT:

I frankly think not, counsel.

14

By the time it gets down to drafting an instruction

15

on what entrapment means, I think there's adequate

16

guidance in the law.

17

MR. PENDLETON:

The Court, as I understand

18

it, has ruled that we have not even presented enough

19

evidence to require the State to put on a case.

20

THE COURT:

That's correct, counsel. That

21

does not mean that you cannot preserve and have not

22

preserved your entrapment defense for the jury.

23

MR. PENDLETON:

24

THE COURT:

25

I realize that.

Think it over, counsel.

It's

awfully late in the day on a Friday afternoon, and I
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think everybody is fatigued on the matter.

We're in

recess.
(Thereupon, the hearing
was concluded.)
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